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Lecture 9 Recap
Why some goods are worth making but hard to sell, how people find ways to pay for them anyway, and why a lake that anyone may fish gets fished too hard.
Class meeting 15 · October 15, 2026 · 10-minute review · The first 38 minutes of class
Markets work best when a seller can keep out people who do not pay. Some goods fail that test. Once a fireworks show starts or a radio signal goes out, everyone nearby gets it, so few people will pay for it. A good can be worth making, because the values of everyone who uses it add up to more than its cost, and still not get made, because each person hopes the others will pay. People find ways around this: taxes, patents and copyrights, advertising, and subscriptions. A resource that anyone may use but that runs out, like the fish in a lake, has the opposite problem: it gets used too fast.
How to use this page
This recap covers the first 38 minutes of the October 15 class, which finished the Lecture 8 slides. Class wrapped up the permit market, then covered the four kinds of goods, public goods and free riders, and the commons. One TopHat item ran. The rest of the class started Lecture 10 (production and costs), which has its own Summary and Transcript. For the permit market from the start, see the Lecture 8 Summary. Read the four-step diagnostic first, then the lecture sections, then the checks. The separate Lecture 9 Transcript has the full explanation.
Use these steps whenever a question asks what kind of good something is, whether it is worth making, or why it is overused.
What you should be able to do
Class finished the Lecture 8 slides in order, from the permit market to the lake.
Finishing the permit market
Class picked up the paint maker and the refiner, with 20 of the 40 credits each. One more credit is worth $2.87 to the paint maker and $1.10 to the refiner, so they are not at an equilibrium. The refiner sells to the paint maker, but it cannot charge more than the market price of $2.20, because the paint maker can buy there instead. They trade until each one’s value of one more credit equals $2.20: the paint maker ends with 30 and the refiner with 10. Total emissions stay at 40.
A student had asked last time why the ocean-view bargain did not look like supply and demand. There was no market for views, only one builder and one group of tenants. Here, a market price for credits exists, and both firms can look at it.
Economists think there is an optimal amount of pollution, and it is not zero. A cap plus trade gets the credits to the firms that value them most. Whether the political process picks the right cap is a separate question.
No one owns the air or the ocean, so no one has a reason to protect them. The same logic explains why chickens, pigs, and cows are not at risk of extinction while rhinos and elephants are. People own the farm animals and profit from them. Some communities near wildlife now fence off reserves and post guards against poachers, because tourists will pay to see the animals. In effect, they are creating property rights in the animals.
Four kinds of goods
A private good is rival and excludable: a student’s laptop. Most of economics is about private goods. A club good is nonrival, up to crowding, and excludable: a swimming pool with a fence and a fee, or a golf course. A common-pool resource is rival but hard to exclude people from: a rhino’s horn or an elephant’s ivory in an open forest, or the fish in the ocean. A pure public good is nonrival and nonexcludable: a fireworks show, or an idea such as the Pythagorean theorem.
Once an idea exists, anyone can use it, so people would have little reason to pay for it. Intellectual property creates rights in ideas: trademarks, patents, trade secrets, and copyright for books, music, and films. A patent makes the invention public in exchange for the right; a trade secret keeps it hidden. That is one reason a firm such as Coca-Cola can prefer to keep its recipe secret rather than patent it.
The trade-off: these rights give people a reason to create new ideas, but they also give the creator a temporary monopoly. That is why patents and copyrights expire.
Governments often provide fireworks shows and pay for them with taxes. National defense is the classic case: the deterrence the military provides protects everyone at once, and it cannot leave out a household that did not pay. Even defense is not always a pure public good: if the country had to fight on two coasts at once, it would have to choose which to defend.
Roads are often called public goods, but a busy road is rival: two cars cannot fill the same space. Tolls show that some roads can exclude non-payers. So a road is closer to a club good or a common-pool resource, depending on how crowded it is.
Hunting and fishing licenses are one way to limit the use of a common-pool resource. Colorado issues elk licenses by lottery and says where each hunter may go: the herds are not stable, so wildlife officials estimate how many animals can be taken each year. Texas pays hunters to kill feral hogs, which multiply fast and damage crops, so there is no reason to ration them. Licenses work only with enforcement: without rangers checking, no one would buy one. Fishing groups can also claim an area, assign each member a quota, and keep outsiders out.
Public goods and free riders · TopHat
Three viewers would pay $5, $3, and $2 for one more episode of a program broadcast over the air, and making it costs $8. Anyone with an antenna can watch, so no one can be charged. Without a way to charge, the episode never gets made.
Yet radio and TV stations exist. They sell advertising, which is rival and excludable: two ads cannot run in the same 30 seconds, and a station can refuse an advertiser who does not pay. The music attracts listeners, and the listeners’ attention is an input the station sells. A satellite service such as Sirius XM takes another route: it turns what would be a public good into a private good that it can sell.
TopHat check. Is the episode worth making? Yes: everyone watches the same episode, so we add the values, and $5 + $3 + $2 = $10, more than $8. The instructor walked through the wrong options. “Every viewer values it above zero” is not enough: if three viewers valued it at $1 each, $3 would not cover $8. The average value, about $3.33, is not the test, and neither is whether any one viewer would pay $8.
Suppose the episode is made only if pledges cover its $8 cost. Viewer B hopes the others will pay and says it is worth $0. The pledges add to $5 + $0 + $2 = $7, less than $8, so nothing is made, and B’s free ride fails. Each viewer is tempted to hold back, yet together they value the episode at $10. That is the free-rider problem.
Group projects work the same way. Everyone in the group gets the same grade, whatever each person puts in, so the grade is in a sense unowned. Each member wants the others to work hard, because that raises the grade, but would rather put in little effort personally. National defense has the same structure: each of us benefits, but each would rather the others pay.
The commons
Anyone may fish the lake, and no rule reserves the catch. Each fisher keeps the fish he catches, while much of the cost of a smaller stock falls on the other fishers. So everyone fishes sooner and harder, with more boats and hours than the extra catch is worth.
That is the theory, but people often cooperate more than it predicts. Elinor Ostrom, the first woman to win the Nobel Prize in economics (2009), studied how local communities manage resources such as forests, fisheries, and pastures, and found that user groups sometimes manage them well. Her Nobel lecture is online: search for “Elinor Ostrom Nobel lecture.”
Do not memorize an example as a story. Use it to recover the economic principle.
| Example from class | Economic lesson |
|---|---|
| The paint maker and the refiner end at 30 and 10 | With a market price for credits, each firm uses credits until one more is worth the price. The cap fixes the total. |
| Chickens versus rhinos | People protect what they own. Fenced reserves with guards create property rights in wildlife. |
| A laptop, a fenced pool, ivory, fireworks | Two tests sort goods: is one person’s use another’s loss, and can non-payers be kept out? |
| The Pythagorean theorem; patents and copyright | An idea is a pure public good. Intellectual property creates a right in it, at the cost of a temporary monopoly. |
| Fireworks paid for by taxes; military deterrence | Taxes are one way to pay for a good that cannot exclude non-payers. |
| A jammed road; a toll road | A road is rival when crowded and excludable when tolled, so it is not a pure public good. |
| Elk licenses in Colorado; feral hogs in Texas | Ration a resource only when it is scarce, and a license limits use only if someone enforces it. |
| Radio stations and advertising; Sirius XM | Sell something excludable alongside the public good, or find a way to exclude. Listeners can be the input, not the customer. |
| Three viewers at $5, $3, and $2 | Add everyone’s value for the same unit. A good can be worth making though no one values it at its full cost. |
| Viewer B says $0; the group project | When no one can be excluded, each person hopes the others will pay, and a worthwhile good may not get made. |
| The lake; Ostrom | A resource anyone may use gets used too fast. Owners, rules, or user groups can reward restraint. |
Answer before you open each one. Every question uses only material from class, with new numbers.
The pizza is a private good: rival and easy to exclude. The mushrooms are a common-pool resource: one person’s pick leaves fewer for others, but keeping pickers out of a large forest is costly. The siren is a pure public good: everyone nearby hears it, and no one can be kept from hearing it. The gym is a club good: nonrival until it gets crowded, and the owner can keep non-members out.
Yes. Everyone gets the same spraying, so add the values: $40 + $25 + $20 + $15 = $100, more than $90. No household values it at $90 on its own; the sum is what counts.
The pledges add to $40 + $0 + $20 + $15 = $75, less than $90, so the spraying does not happen, though the block values it at $100. That is the free-rider problem: the household that held back loses the spraying too.
No. The streetlight is nonrival, so add the values: 5 × $12 = $60, more than $50. Neither the largest single value nor the average is the test.
Free, it can sell advertising: the listeners’ attention is an input it sells to advertisers, which is rival and excludable. Behind a paywall, non-payers are kept out, so the podcast becomes excludable, like a club good, and listeners become the customers.
The patent lets the company charge for its idea, which gives it a reason to spend on research. It also gives the company a temporary monopoly, so the drug costs more while the patent lasts. Patents expire so that, after a time, anyone may copy the drug. The patent also makes the formula public, which is why some firms keep a trade secret instead.
The owner sends it: he gains $500 − $400 = $100 a day. But the other boats lose 8 × $25 = $200 a day, a cost the owner does not bear. In all, the ninth boat makes the people who fish the lake $100 a day worse off. That is the commons problem.
Few people buy licenses, because no one checks, and the lake is still fished too hard. A license limits use only if someone enforces it.
Not a pure one. At 3 a.m. one more car takes nothing from anyone, so it is nonrival. At 5 p.m. each car slows the others, so it is rival. Tolls can keep non-payers out, which would make it excludable. It is closer to a club good when empty and tolled, and to a common-pool resource when jammed and free.
Each member gains when the others work hard but bears the full cost of his own effort, so each is tempted to put in little: a free-rider problem. Tying each person’s grade to his own work, for example with peer evaluations, makes each member bear the result of his effort.
Bottom line
Two tests sort goods: rivalry and excludability. A pure public good can be worth making, because everyone’s values add up, yet go unmade, because each person hopes the others will pay. People pay for such goods through taxes, intellectual property, advertising, and ways to exclude, and each route gives something up. A resource anyone may use gets used too fast; owners, enforced licenses, and user groups can slow it. Next, Lecture 10 turns to production and cost.
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